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Governance, good governance and global governance: conceptual and actual challenges

THOMAS G WEISS

ABSTRACT This article takes seriously the proposition that ideas and concepts, both good and bad, have an impact on international public policy. It situates the emergence of governance, good governance and global governance, as well as the UN’s role in the conceptual process. Although ‘governance’ is as old as human history, this essay concentrates on the intellectual debates of the 1980s and 1990s but explores such earlier UN-related ideas as decolonisation, localisation and human rights, against which more recent thinking has been played out. A central analytical perspective is the tension between many academics and international practitioners who employ ‘governance’ to connote a complex set of structures and processes, both public and private, while more popular writers tend to use it synonymously with ‘government’.

‘Governance’ is now fashionable, but the concept is as old as human history. This essay concentrates on the intellectual debates of the 1980s and 1990s, essentially since the term became widespread in development circles and prominent in the international public policy lexicon. Many academics and international practitioners employ ‘governance’ to connote a complex set of structures and processes, both public and private, while more popular writers tend to use it synonymously with ‘government’.

Governance for the latter refers to characteristics that are generally associated with a system of national administration. The New Webster’s International Dictionary defines the term in much the same way as journalists from the New York Times or The Economist: ‘act, manner, office, or power of governing; government’, ‘state of being governed’, or ‘method of government or regulation’. As Morten Bøås has shown, before being studied at the global level, governance was employed generically in academic discourse. It was, for instance, widely used in relationship to business literature about the micro-behaviour of firms. Goran Hyden has argued that it refers mainly to running governments and other public agencies or private ones with social purposes.

Analysts of international relations and international civil servants, in contrast, now use the term almost exclusively to describe phenomena that go beyond a synonym for ‘government’ and the legal authority with which such polities are vested. For instance, the Commission on Global Governance defines
‘governance’ as ‘the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs. It is the continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and co-operative action may be taken’. James Rosenau is the US academic most closely associated with the term. And for him, whether at the grassroots or global levels, it ‘encompasses the activities of governments, but it also includes the many other channels through which “commands” flow in the form of goals framed, directives issued, and policies pursued’.6

Something of an intellectual cottage industry has arisen around the term over the past two decades. Since the early 1980s, ‘governance’ and increasingly ‘good governance’ have permeated development discourse and especially research agendas and other activities funded by public and private banks and bilateral donors. Moreover, publications by scholars and eminent commissions have extensively used the term for contemporary global problem solving.7

The emergence of governance can be traced at the country level to a disgruntlement with the state-dominated models of economic and social development so prevalent throughout the socialist bloc and much of the Third World in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. At the international level ‘global governance’ can be traced to a growing dissatisfaction among students of international relations with the realist and liberal–institutionalist theories that dominated the study of international organisation in the 1970s and 1980s. In particular, these failed to capture adequately the vast increase, in both numbers and influence, of non-state actors and the implications of technology in an age of globalisation.

This article takes seriously the proposition that ideas and concepts, both good and bad, have an impact. In pointing to the role of policy and academic ‘scribblers’, John Maynard Keynes wrote in 1936 that ‘the ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood’.8 This essay thus seeks to correct the fact that ideas, whether economic or otherwise, have until recently been ignored by students of international relations.9 It situates the emergence of governance, good governance and global governance, as well as the role of the United Nations (UN), in the conceptual process.

**Governance and good governance**

The world organisation was built on the basis of unquestioned national sovereignty. In spite of article 2(7) of the UN Charter, sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of states have come under fire. As former Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali wrote, ‘The time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty, however, has passed’.10 Sovereignty’s status and relevance are contested increasingly within international organisations and forums. Moreover, the climate for governance has changed immensely since the UN’s founding. Indeed, definitions of governance vary substantially, as is evident from views on governance of various international organisations shown below.
World Bank. Governance is defined as the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources. The World Bank has identified three distinct aspects of governance: (i) the form of political regime; (ii) the process by which authority is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for development; and (iii) the capacity of governments to design, formulate, and implement policies and discharge functions.\textsuperscript{11}

UNDP. Governance is viewed as the exercise of economic, political and administrative authority to manage a country’s affairs at all levels. It comprises mechanisms, processes and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences.\textsuperscript{12}

OECD. The concept of governance denotes the use of political authority and exercise of control in a society in relation to the management of its resources for social and economic development. This broad definition encompasses the role of public authorities in establishing the environment in which economic operators function and in determining the distribution of benefits as well as the nature of the relationship between the ruler and the ruled.\textsuperscript{13}

Institute of Governance, Ottawa. Governance comprises the institutions, processes and conventions in a society which determine how power is exercised, how important decisions affecting society are made and how various interests are accorded a place in such decisions.\textsuperscript{14}

Commission on Global Governance. Governance is the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and co-operative action may be taken. It includes formal institutions and regimes empowered to enforce compliance, as well as informal arrangements that people and institutions either have agreed to or perceive to be in their interest.\textsuperscript{15}

UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. Good governance is ensuring respect for human rights and the rule of law; strengthening democracy; promoting transparency and capacity in public administration.\textsuperscript{16}

International Institute of Administrative Sciences. Governance refers to the process whereby elements in society wield power and authority, and influence and enact policies and decisions concerning public life, and economic and social development. Governance is a broader notion than government. Governance involves interaction between these formal institutions and those of civil society.\textsuperscript{17}

Tokyo Institute of Technology. The concept of governance refers to the complex set of values, norms, processes and institutions by which society manages its development and resolves conflict, formally and informally.
It involves the state, but also the civil society (economic and social actors, community-based institutions and unstructured groups, the media, etc) at the local, national, regional and global levels.\textsuperscript{18}

The emphasis is on the past two decades, even though there is a rich history of such earlier UN-related ideas as decolonisation, localisation and human rights, against which more recent thinking has been played out. What is important to note here is the dramatic quantitative and qualitative shift in the political ambience at the UN since the late 1950s and early 1960s. During the Cold War, governmental representatives of newly independent countries were successfully on the defensive within UN and related international fora; they remained largely untouched by the rich scholarly debate about the ‘new political economy’,\textsuperscript{19} ‘social capital’,\textsuperscript{20} and ‘public goods’.\textsuperscript{21} They interpreted virtually any serious scrutiny of their economic and social choices as a threat to their newborn and weak states. And they remained impervious to the international political economy literature of the 1970s and 1980s that emphasised public choice theory, rent-seeking behaviour, directly unproductive profit-seeking activities, and the new institutional economics.\textsuperscript{22}

By playing off East versus West, moreover, developing countries deflected many criticisms by donors and investors if they hinted at shortcomings in economic and political management. Suggestions about what was wrong with economic and social policies in developing and socialist bloc countries were viewed as siding with the ‘enemy’ in the East–West struggle. And the ‘other’ side could be persuaded to be less critical, and even financially supportive, as part of world-wide competition.

The result was an unquestioning, and at times almost obsequious, acceptance of the status quo. Francis M Deng and Terrence Lyons have summarised the situation in Africa, but their comment has greater resonance: ‘Rather than promote good governance by awarding sovereign rights to those regimes that effectively or responsibly administered a given territory, African diplomatic principles, epitomized by the Organization of African Unity (OAU), accepted whatever regime occupied the presidential palace, regardless of who (or even whether) the regime governed.’\textsuperscript{23}

Ironically, OPEC’s ability to increase oil prices in 1973–74 and again in 1979 strengthened the collective bargaining strength of the Group of 77 and produced foreign exchange shortages and unsustainable indebtedness that, in turn, forced many non-oil-exporting developing countries to accept intrusive structural adjustment. Outside interference in economic policy was the \textit{quid pro quo} of desperately needed international finance, especially from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as the lender of last resort, or the seal of approval required by other funders.\textsuperscript{24}

As the twin pillars of the postwar economic system, the World Bank and the IMF had emphasised domestic policies for sometime.\textsuperscript{25} But the UN system had a different orientation and profile. The preponderance of developing countries in the membership made debates distinct from those in Washington where weighted voting privileged the voices of powerful donors. However, with the arrival of the Kohl, Thatcher and Reagan administrations, Western rhetoric had a substantial impact on New York as well as Washington.
The refrain to emphasise domestic priorities assumed more weight and was increasingly pertinent after the September 1981 World Bank report from Professor Elliot Berg. Later in the decade the Bank issued a more holistic sequel that emphasised political and institutional change as prerequisites for effective economic reform. Within the UN system too, the new orthodoxy of more aid and investment in exchange for economic liberalisation eroded the reluctance to intrude in domestic policies, what two analysts had described as ‘the global Keynesian social pact suggested by the Brandt Commission’.

Such external economic factors as commodity prices and interest rates could not be totally set aside as explanations for poverty and poor economic performance. But it became untenable to attribute all the woes of developing countries to outside forces beyond their control. This was particularly the case after Mikhail Gorbachev’s ascension to power in 1985 and the onset of ‘new thinking’ in Moscow. There was no longer a geopolitical counterweight in the East to Western demands for economic liberalisation and political democratisation.

Domestic policies and priorities were central to the dire problems faced by both developing countries and members of the socialist bloc. And it became politically more correct in international fora to say so and thereby begin a conversation about how state and society were structured. As Goran Hyden has written: ‘Getting politics right is different from getting policy right in that it calls for a restructuring of the polity itself. The structural adjustment programs that are associated with getting policy right have been and could be pursued by an autocratic government as well as a democratic one.’ A discussion about the quality of a country’s political and economic governance system became acceptable within international public policy fora for four reasons.

First, there was the glaring illegitimacy of regimes headed by such international pariahs as Uganda’s Idi Amin, Kampuchea’s Pol Pot, Haiti’s Jean-Claude Duvalier, or the Central African Empire’s Jean-Bédel Bokassa. After having successfully lobbied the so-called international community to consider as genuinely ‘international’ the domestic policies of white-majority governments in Rhodesia and South Africa, it was illogical for developing countries to maintain that their own domestic behaviour was out-of-bounds. Moreover, the end of the Cold War suddenly removed both the willingness to turn a blind-eye towards outlandish regimes as well as incentives for the West to support authoritarian rule.

Second, Samuel Huntington correctly characterised the ‘third wave’ of democratic rule. Both the Third World and the former Soviet bloc were engulfed by a tidal wave of political reforms, especially when the collapse of the Berlin Wall was so closely followed by the implosion of Moscow’s empire. Widespread democratisation, including UN monitoring of elections in such former dictatorships as El Salvador and Haiti, brought squarely into focus the character and quality of local governance. Regimes in the Third World and Eastern Europe adopted civilian rule, elections and multiparty democracy. They understood that the form, if not always the spirit and content, of elections were prerequisites to legitimise their rule and to attract Western financing. Investors and aid agencies insisted, and most potential recipients—with notable exceptions like China, North Korea, Cuba, Libya and Iraq—accepted this approach.
Third, the proliferation of non-state actors changed the political landscape in most countries. In addition to the organisations of the UN system and the Washington-based financial institutions, such international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) as Human Rights Watch and CARE, such transnational corporations as Shell and Citibank, and such global media as the BBC and CNN penetrated what had formerly been something of a governmental chasse gardée. They exerted a growing influence on what once had been almost exclusively matters of state policy. Within developing and socialist bloc countries, civil society burgeoned after decades of repression. In particular, the growth of NGOs is a striking dimension of contemporary international relations whose implications for global governance and social policy in the UN system are not fully understood or appreciated.\textsuperscript{31} In short, economic and social policy is no longer the exclusive preserve of governments. Human rights advocates, gender activists, developmentists and groups of indigenous peoples have invaded the territory of states, literally and figuratively.

Fourth, the 1990s have witnessed a phenomenal transformation of the widespread view that the ‘Charter is a Westphalian document par excellence’\textsuperscript{32}. Although the UN’s constitution prohibits actions dealing with the domestic policies of member states, nonetheless humanitarian interventions have encouraged the insertion of responsibility as a necessary additional component of national sovereignty, in addition to the three traditional characteristics of statehood (territory, people and authority). Leading the human rights charge were none other than the last two UN secretaries-general, Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Kofi Annan, who painstakingly put forward the contingent character of sovereignty.\textsuperscript{33} Francis Deng, their Special Representative on Internally Displaced Persons, labelled this approach ‘sovereignty as responsibility’\textsuperscript{34}. The acute suffering of such failed states as Somalia, the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda opened the door to scrutinizing domestic policies that had led to mass displacement and even genocide. Given the need for the international system to pick up the costly humanitarian bill for such tragedies, the prevention of future disasters lent additional weight to the argument to examine governance patterns in as-yet un-failed states.\textsuperscript{35}

As a result of these four developments, probing domestic policies and priorities became the norm; and efforts to come to grips with the term can be interpreted as part of an intellectual struggle to capture the various units of governance that are not instruments of the state. At the national level the work of Morten Bøås is particularly instructive, because governance is embedded in and interwoven with state–civil society interactions. It is the part of the public realm that encompasses both. Essential to governance is the civic realm, which is maintained by political actors from both the state and society, and in which ‘access to participation in the public realm is built on respected and legitimate rules’. Therefore, ‘governance is concerned with the regime which constitutes the set of fundamental rules for the organization of the public realm, and not with government … Governance clearly embraces government institutions, but it also subsumes informal, non-governmental institutions operating within the public realm.’\textsuperscript{36} By conceptualising governance in terms that transcend traditional notions of domestic politics, Bøås’ treatment of the subject clarifies how
national governance involves non-governmental actors exercising authority legitimately in the public realm.

Although Rosenau focuses on the dynamics of the international system, his analytical lenses are helpful in pointing out that all governance ‘refers to mechanisms for steering social systems toward their goals’.\textsuperscript{37} As such, agency is important. At the national level then, we need to conceptualise governance in terms that include but also transcend the formal government apparatus. However, and in spite of the explosive growth in profit and not-for-profit groups in civil society, governments remain the primary agents. The provision of public goods as well as incentive structures for corporations’ and voluntary agencies’ contributing to social problem solving are largely determined by government policy.

In short, actions to foster good governance concentrate on attenuating two undesirable characteristics that had been prevalent earlier: the unrepresentative character of governments and the inefficiency of non-market systems. As governance is the sum of the ways that individuals and institutions, in both public and private spheres, manage their affairs, the systems of governance in much of the Third World and Eastern Europe had to change. As Bøås has written, ‘the World Bank operationalised “bad governance” as personalisation of power, lack of human rights, endemic corruption and un-elected and unaccountable governments’. And so, ‘good governance must be the natural opposite’.\textsuperscript{38} Since good governance has become an important component of the international agenda, discourse about good governance was linked to new policies in those countries receiving development assistance or investments from international lending agencies. Good governance has become a political and economic conditionality that is inseparable from debates about appropriate bilateral and multilateral financing for developing and formerly socialist bloc countries. International efforts, in recent decades, have thus supported political democratisation (including elections, accountability and human rights) and economic liberalisation.

Recent experience with good governance has led to criticism from the UN system, which seeks to balance assessments about costs and benefits as well as to confront the political and economic conditionality viewed by many recipient countries as unwelcome intrusions. Good governance is definitely on the international agenda. But three types of substantive UN commentary have applied the brakes and slowed the momentum of the Washington consensus.

The first is the need to capture the complex reality of governance, which encompasses all the structures and processes for determining the use of available resources for the public good within a country. Although debate continues about its precise components, good governance is more than multiparty elections, a judiciary and a parliament, which have been emphasised as the primary symbols of Western-style democracy. The list of other attributes, with the necessary resources and culture to accompany them, is formidable: universal protection of human rights; non-discriminatory laws; efficient, impartial and rapid judicial processes; transparent public agencies; accountability for decisions by public officials; devolution of resources and decision making to local levels from the capital; and meaningful participation by citizens in debating public policies and choices.
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) leads in defining the characteristics of a population that lives within a society in which governance is good. The annual *Human Development Report* provides as close to an authoritative snapshot as we have. Following 10 years of structural adjustment loans, the effort began in 1990 under the leadership of Mahbub ul Haq and has continued since 1996 under Richard Jolly. The UNDP has sought to shed light systematically on the actual lives of people, especially those on the bottom of the income scale. In many ways the decade’s collection of the annual *Human Development Reports*—which are now available on a single compact disc—was a prelude to and a prolongation of the 1995 Social Summit in Copenhagen. Without denying the benefits of growth, these reports and the Copenhagen conference insist on cataloguing: 1) the aggravation of poverty and the growing divides between rich and poor, within societies as well as among them; 2) increasing unemployment; 3) a disintegrating social fabric and exclusion; and 4) environmental damage.

The value of the human development index (HDI) is the modification of what constitutes an acceptable way to measure a society with good governance. Economic well-being and human progress are not synonymous. Countries with the same per capita income can have quite different HDIs, and countries with the same levels of income can also have similar HDIs. The clear message is that the content of domestic policies and priorities is crucial.

The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) has, since 1987, issued annual reports on the lives of vulnerable children and women, this coincided with the pioneering earlier efforts by the organisation to put social problems at the centre of the debate about the impact of adjustment. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has published a bi-annual overview of the beleaguered status of war victims since 1993. One consequence of these analytical efforts is that the World Bank’s informationally rich annual *World Development Report* has gradually become more attuned to measuring the ‘softer’ side of living conditions within countries.

The second substantive criticism from the UN system is the need to strike a balance between the public and private sectors. Again, analyses have sought to go beyond democratic symbols and portray the necessary elements of public welfare. The composite view of the UN system amounts to something of a reprise of Keynesianism by pointing to the ineluctable importance of state decisions to determine the management of both supply and demand.
the only acceptable and common-sensical prescriptions about how to structure political and economic life were those of the Washington consensus. The intellectual climate had changed so much that, for a decade between the mid-1980s and mid-1990s, it was almost heretical to argue that an efficient, thriving market economy and civil society require an effective and strong government. Antonio Gramsci would have found an apt illustration of his argument that ideologies can have the ‘same energy as material force’.45

But an artificial dichotomy had been created between ‘state’ and ‘market’. The UN’s incipient heresy against this conventional wisdom was perhaps best exemplified by analyses of the former Soviet bloc, where ‘shrinking’ but not ‘rolling back’ the state was the policy recommendation. A report from UNDP’s Regional Bureau for Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States emphasised the prerequisites for equity, legitimacy and efficiency: ‘A legitimately strong government can be described as one that commands sufficient confidence in its legitimacy to allow for a strong civil society, and for a network of non-governmental institutions and regulations that ensure the development of a well-functioning economic system, the strengthening of democratic procedures, and a widespread participation by people in public life.’46

In a departure from previous orthodoxy and as a sign of the pendulum’s swing, the Bank’s World Development Report 1997 emphasised that the state is capable, and indeed should perform the role, of producing welfare-enhancing outcomes. As the text itself argues: ‘And there is a growing recognition that some needed public goods and services can only be secured through international cooperation. Thus, building state capacity will mean building more effective partnerships and institutions internationally as well as at home.’47 The report’s subtitle, The State in a Changing World, was indicative of a reversal led by Joseph Stiglitz, until December 1999 the much-discussed chief economist and senior vice-president.48 The controversy surrounding Stiglitz’s tenure in Washington reflected the fact that, in comparison with most other officials in the Bank and the Fund, he appeared more sympathetic towards striking a balance between market and state and more ambivalent about the potential for unfettered market forces. As such, his resignation also was predictable.

Thus, the UN’s conceptual contribution has altered the emphasis in the ‘good governance’ debate of the mid-1980s to mid-1990s. Rescuing the baby from the discarded bath water, today’s debate about good governance has moved away from a visceral dismantling of the state. In contrast with narrower economic liberalisation programmes in vogue earlier, political liberalisation programmes of the late 1990s (with greater emphasis on leadership and management as well as democracy, human rights, rule of law, access to justice and basic freedoms) have weakened the force of arguments by proponents of a ‘minimalist state’. Whereas the original debate about good governance was cast as the antithesis of state-dominated economic and social development of previous decades, today’s is less about jettisoning state institutions than improving and reforming the functioning of democratic institutions, including the ‘deepening’ of democracy and exploring more active and creative roles for non-state actors. Leaders are being held to higher standards of accountability, and they have to contend with
The forces of globalisation. But there is less faith in a blanket prescription to roll back the state.

The World Bank’s published stance presupposes what is ‘good’ and what is ‘not good’ governance. In working to remove ‘politics’ from the debate (its charter supposedly precludes directly addressing political issues), the Bank’s position on governance is preoccupied with public sector management, the reduction of transaction costs and contract enforcement. These issues are certainly linked to sustainable human development but are not framed as central to a conception of and strategy for governance that as a priority seeks to maximise local participation in addressing the most pressing needs in a given community. In contrast, the UNDP’s and the UN system’s evolving human development approach to governance exhibits relatively greater support for empowerment—that is, providing the tools of democracy and freedom that are integral to the political and civic dimensions of governance. The Bank may not be adverse to these issues but treats them as second order concerns, or ‘tag on’s’, that are not valuable in and of themselves but rather desirable insofar as they contribute to efficiency and growth. Under the new political economy of the 1970s and 1980s, political rationality among policy makers was emphasised as a variation on the neoclassical theme of economic rationality. This theme greatly influenced the crafting of the international financial institutions’ (IFIs) governance priorities of the 1980s and 1990s aimed at increasing economic efficiency and growth.

Since the early 1990s UNDP has begun shifting away from traditional public sector management (particularly civil service reform) and modest decentralisation programmes to addressing such sensitive governance areas as human rights, legislative support, judicial reform and corruption. Responding to the growth in transitional democracies, UNDP’s emphasis on electoral assistance has provided an entry point to dealing with this ‘new generation’ of governance projects. With resources to pursue this agenda, other factors also contributed to UNDP’s growing involvement: fewer ideological tensions since the end of the Cold War; a growing consensus about the need for such political reforms; better information flows; and dissatisfaction with, and continual decreases in, traditional development assistance.

The new frontiers of governance policy and support for institution building require trust and a perceived neutral position in a target country. Capacity building for civil society and the private sector mean that the UN system has a comparative advantage in many developing countries in relationship to the IFIs. The UNDP’s approach to governance will continue to differ from that of the Bretton Woods institutions as long as they view ‘good governance’ in terms of strict political and economic conditionality. Given UNDP’s role as the lead UN agency in the field and as a prominent contributor to UN policy debates, it is likely that the rest of the UN system will gradually adopt UNDP’s brand of governance. This argument has particular salience after the 1999 establishment of a Governance Division, along with the enthusiasm for this topic of the new Administrator, Mark Malloch Brown.

We are moving towards common ground that good governance does not necessarily mean less but sometimes more appropriate government. There is no
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need to resurrect the folly of the stereotypical hyperactive state of the 1960s and 1970s. However, we require processes or rules of decision making that are more likely to result in actions that are truly in the public interest, rather than favouring the private exploitation of the public interest. There is a need to balance the role of government and other political and economic institutions with functioning markets. More than occasionally, a countervailing power to market externalities is required. And the only candidate is the state. The central challenge is not to halt the expansion of the market but to establish proper rules and institutions so that the benefits of growth are more widely beneficial.

The third and final substantive criticism from the United Nations is the need to introduce subtlety into the infatuation with democracy and democratisation as surrogates for good governance. The argument that individual political rights and democratisation go hand-in-hand with good governance is not wrong. But it has been expanded to reflect economic and social rights as part of a comprehensive ‘package’.51

In short, the initial debate over good governance was concerned less with improving the political leadership of democracy and integrating economic and social goals (eg through the initiation of more active and creative roles for non-state actors) than with reversing decades of state-dominated economic and social development. Now that the state’s role has come into question, the emphasis in UN circles has changed. Going beyond the largely empty Cold War clash between ‘first’ (political and civil right) and ‘second generation’ (economic and social) rights, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and former Irish President Mary Robinson continually emphasises integration of economic and social welfare into the bundle of goods that any well governed society must have.52 As such, good governance can also entail improvements in governmental institutions and sound development management. As Bøas writes, ‘State and civil society are constituted through iterated interaction, and the governance produced (bad or good) is an outcome of this process’.53 Mahbub ul Haq went further still towards the end of his life. Maintaining that ‘the concept of good governance has so far failed to match the radicalism of the notion of human development’,54 researchers at his centre in Islamabad launched an inclusive and ambitious idea, ‘humane governance’. This definition includes good political, economic and civic governance.

Humane governance involves those structures and processes that support the creation of a participatory, responsive and accountable polity (that is, good political governance) embedded in a competitive, non-discriminatory, yet equitable economy (that is, good economic governance). This requires the resources contributed by people to be ploughed back to serve their own basic human needs, which will in turn expand the opportunities open to them; people must be given the ability to self-organise (that is, good civic governance). Bounded together by such principles as ‘ownership’, ‘decency’, and ‘accountability’, the components of humane governance are inextricably linked.

The host of definitions earlier in this essay suggests the importance of ideas. Governance and its prescriptive partner of good governance have elicited not only commentary by scholars and development practitioners but also policy changes by national governments and international funding agencies. The forces
of democratisation and globalisation are pressuring ‘good governance’ proponents to reorient their priorities from the exigencies of economic growth and efficiency to those governance policies and institutions that best promote greater freedom, genuine participation and sustainable human development. It is on this fundamental point that thinking at the UN is currently ahead of the curve, compared with the conventional wisdom in the corridors of the Washington-based IFIs. Ironically, the UN would probably not have moved so quickly without the sea change in world politics after the end of the Cold War and without pressure from donors.

The conceptual and operational battles about governance and good governance are a few decades old, but the journey to explore global governance has just begun. It is hardly surprising then that the debate is more inchoate than the one about governance within countries. Thus far, the commentary from academics and practitioners has led to more heat than light—there is no consensus about desirable changes in policy or discourse. It is important, however, that the intellectual trek has started. It is to this story that we now turn.

**Global governance**

At the same time that most of Europe adopts the Euro and moves toward a common defence and security policy, how can the former Yugoslavia implode? Rosenau invented the term ‘fragmegration’ to capture the confusion in the simultaneous integration and fragmentation of societal interactions and authority patterns. Moreover, burgeoning information, communication, market, finance, networking and business activities are producing a world in which patterns are extremely difficult to discern.

This has not slowed publications and speculations. One analyst has gone so far as to quip that ‘we say “governance” because we don’t really know what to call what is going on’. The rubric of ‘global governance’ is akin to ‘post-cold war’, which signifies that one period has ended but that we do not as yet have an accurate short-hand to depict the essential dynamics of the new epoch. Analysts are understandably uncomfortable with the traditional frameworks and vocabulary used to describe international relations; today’s conceptual tools are elementary.

In spite of vagueness in ongoing scholarly and policy debates, the application of the notion of governance to the globe was the natural result of mounting evidence that the international system was no longer composed simply of states, but rather that the world was undergoing fundamental change. Although such actors as the Catholic Church, General Motors and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) are hardly new to the Westphalian system, the proliferation of non-state actors and their growing importance and power is a distinctive feature of contemporary world affairs.

Global governance invokes shifting the location of authority in the context of integration and fragmentation. Rosenau describes the process as ‘a pervasive tendency ... in which major shifts in the location of authority and the site of control mechanisms are under way on every continent, shifts that are as pronounced in economic and social systems as they are in political systems’.
The essential challenge for international co-operation jumps out from the title of his edited volume, *Governance Without Government*. Mobilising support from the bottom up involves increasing the skills and capacities of individuals and altering the horizons of identification in patterns of global life. Elsewhere, Rosenau characterises global governance as ‘systems of rule at all levels of human activity—from the family to the international organization—in which the pursuit of goals through the exercise of control has transnational repercussions’.\(^*\)\(^5\) Oran Young has argued that the value of the concept is that identifiable social practices can be envisaged and sometimes undertaken to improve economic, social and environmental performance even without the formal institutions capable of authoritatively taking action.\(^*\)\(^6\)

The phenomenal economic expansion and technological progress of the 1990s have not benefited the world’s citizens equally. The unevenness of the economic playing field and the power of players on it is evident. Using the three essential components of the human development idea—equality of opportunity, sustainability and empowerment of people—a bleaker picture emerges from UNDP and other UN reports than from conventional wisdom. For instance, income per capita and average purchasing power in some 100 countries was lower in 1994 than in the 1980s; in 70 it was actually lower than in the 1970s, and in 35 lower than in the 1960s.\(^*\)\(^6\)

If information technologies are driving growth or are a prerequisite for it, the increasing concentration of income, resources and wealth among people, corporations and countries does not bode well. The richest 20% of the world’s population living in the wealthiest countries account for over 93% of internet users while the bottom 20% account for only 0.2 percent.\(^*\)\(^6\)

Globalisation is neither uniform nor homogeneous, but it is indisputably accelerating the pace and intensity of economic and social interactions at all levels. Although globalisation has a long history,\(^*\)\(^6\) its present manifestation is fundamentally different in scale, intensity and form from what preceded. As David Held and others have put it, ‘Contemporary globalization represents the beginning of a new epoch in human affairs … as profound an impact as the Industrial Revolution and the global empires of the nineteenth century’.\(^*\)\(^6\)

Students and professors, policy analysts and practitioners should not feel uncomfortable about admitting their uneasiness and ignorance about understanding the details of the contemporary political economy, and especially not about the best way to address a bewildering array of global problems.

As such, the logical link between the patterns of governance at the national and global levels lies in solving the collective action puzzle to provide public goods. ‘In both modern domestic political systems and the modern international system, the state has been the key structural arena within which collective action has been situated and undertaken’, observes Philip Cerny. And as a result of a multiplicity of interactions, ‘the authority, legitimacy, policy making capacity, and policy-implementing effectiveness of the state will be eroded and undermined both within and without’.\(^*\)\(^6\) Globalisation has profound consequences for the nature of collective action in both domestic and international politics. Cerny argues that, as market activity intensifies and economic organisation becomes increasingly complex, the institutional scale of political structures is no longer capable of providing a suitable range of public goods. In effect, economic
globalisation is undermining the effectiveness of state-based collective action, which was extremely weak in the first place. Although the state remains a cultural force, its effectiveness as a civil association has declined. The result may be a crisis of legitimacy. State-based collective action has not reached its end, but it is significantly different from in the past.

Although realists and idealists who analyse international organisations disagree about many issues, they agree that the state system is ‘anarchic’. Whatever the framers of the UN Charter had in mind, and whatever Keynes and his colleagues imagined at Bretton Woods, nothing like an overarching authority for either the high politics of international peace and security or the low politics of economic and social development has emerged.

In one essential aspect then, ‘global governance’ is quite distinct from good or bad governance at the national level. A ‘good’ (that is, accountable, efficient, lawful, representative and transparent) government usually leads to good governance, while bad governance is closely correlated with a conspicuously bad government. Prescriptions to improve policy and decision making flow naturally, albeit controversially, from adjusting both the potential contribution of the state as agent and the rules of the economic and social game so that more contributions to the public good can be teased from non-state actors. The merits of more or less interventionist stances can be debated, but there is at least a primary and identifiable sovereign agent at the helm.

There is no such actor for the planet. Although the glass clearly is less full than we would like, Mark Zacher reminds us that the modest order in today’s international economic system results from international efforts: ‘In short, without these and other regimes and public goods generated by the UN system, it would truly be “a jungle out there”.’ At the same time, the conceptual and operational challenges of global governance are formidable.

We require a term to signify the reality that there has never been a world government, and there undoubtedly never will be one. Thus, at both the country and global levels, governance encompasses more than government. But as there is no government at the global level, of what utility is the notion? Is it, as Brian Urquhart once quipped, like the grinning but bodyless Cheshire cat in *Alice in Wonderland*, an agreeable notion because it is without substance?

Global governance should perhaps be seen as a heuristic device to capture and describe the confusing and seemingly ever-accelerating transformation of the international system. States are central but their authority is eroding in important ways. Their creations, intergovernmental organisations, are no more in control than they ever were. Local and international NGOs are proliferating and gaining authority and resources. And technological developments are increasing the wherewithal of corporations and criminal groups. Within this context, collective action problems associated with the provision of global public goods have become even more of a challenge, conceptual and practical, than is their provision in the national setting.

Purposeful activity for the planet necessitates a conceptual framework to capture the reality that supranational control or even countervailing power are not operational concepts for the time being. Ironically we are not even closer than we were in 1945. One prominent group of economists has observed that
international institutions have weakened precisely at a time when global interdependence has increased.\(^{67}\) ‘But who plays the role of the development-oriented state in the global economy?’ Canadian economist Gerry Helleiner asked the Second Committee of the General Assembly. ‘Today’s global financial world … is utterly different from that facing the original architects of the Bretton Woods system in 1944’.\(^{68}\)

It is humbling to realise that even a relatively powerful institution like the IMF is not the global monetary manager that it was supposed to be. It is a pale imitation of the institution for which Keynes was such a passionate advocate. Instead of reserves equal to half of world imports, the IMF’s liquidity equals less than 2% of global imports.

In such a world, proponents and theorists of global governance face enormous difficulties in making hard-hitting policy prescriptions. In the face of anarchy, what mechanisms should be primarily responsible for global governance? Is there a way to structure a reasonable measure of co-ordination and co-operation among governments, intergovernmental organisations, non-governmental organisations and the private sector that would constitute meaningful, or at least improved, patterns of global governance? If it is the product of purposeful decisions and goal-orientated behaviour, how can global governance exist in the absence of a clear consensus about goals? To what extent does global governance depend on shared values and norms?

One common reaction, especially among representatives of governments, is to fall back on familiar ways of thought by attempting to recapture the ‘good old days’ of state-centric authority. Russian and Chinese reactions in the Security Council join those of developing countries there and in the UN General Assembly in trying to emphasise the centrality of the state and forestall erosions of its prerogatives. The US reliance upon exceptionalism and unilateralism within the multilateral system is another illustration of related rearguard impulses.\(^{69}\)

Sovereignty is not dead, but it is hardly as sacrosanct as it once was. In attempting to protest too much, governmental representatives are highlighting daily in international fora the extent to which contemporary authority patterns are in flux and quite different from those of the past. The visceral resistance to change among governments and intergovernmental secretariats contrasts markedly with the greater agility of most businesses and NGOs. There is no philosophical justification or constitutional specification that assigns the highest form of authority to states, but representatives from national governments act as if there were.

Other analysts seek to recapture the naïveté of the period just before and after the end of World War Two, when intergovernmental organisations were panaceas that would make the world safe from both war and economic recession. Larry Finkelstein, for instance, sees global governance as ‘doing internationally what governments do at home’.\(^{70}\) But his formulation fails to specify the agents that are supposed to accomplish globally the numerous tasks that governments do nationally.

Neither our understanding nor our problem-solving efforts are any longer served, as Rosenau cautions, ‘by clinging to the notion that states and national
governments are the essential underpinnings of the world’s organization’. With an increasing diffusion of authority and a corresponding loss of control, states and the intergovernmental organisations created by them are no longer always the only or even the most important players on the world stage. Depending on the issue, member states retain many attributes of sovereignty, but they are past their prime and share the spotlight with numerous other actors.

Interestingly enough, the Commission on Global Governance was composed of 28 commissioners whose professional experiences were almost exclusively within governments and intergovernmental secretariats. They were clear about not advocating a world government or even world federalism. In the light of their backgrounds, it is noteworthy that global governance for the members of the commission does not mean a single model, nor even a single structure or set of structures. Instead, ‘it is a broad, dynamic, complex process of interactive decision-making that is constantly evolving and responding to changing circumstances’. Global governance implies a wide and seemingly ever-growing range of actors in every domain. Global economic and social affairs have traditionally been viewed as embracing primarily intergovernmental relationships, but increasingly they must be framed in comprehensive enough terms to embrace local and international NGOs, grassroots and citizens’ movements, multinational corporations and the global capital market.

There is one notable similarity to democratisation at the national level because more inclusive and participatory—hence, truly ‘democratic’—mechanisms for consultations and ultimately governance must be created at the global level as well. They should be malleable enough to respond to an ever-changing environment. There is a crucial similarity in the reasoning of both theorists like Rosenau and practitioners like the members of the Commission on Global Governance to distinguish ‘governance’ from ‘government’. At the global level there can be no single model or form, nor even a single structure or set of structures.

For the moment, we are unable even to describe accurately all the dimensions of international economic and social interactions—what Rosenau has aptly described as causal chains that ‘follow crazy-quilt patterns’. The proverbial bottom line is: there is no clear-cut equivalent at the global level to the national prescriptions of democratisation and economic liberalisation as the constituent components of humane governance.

Conclusion

In light of its universality and scope, the UN will have a special role, albeit not a monopoly, on future leadership for global governance. One group of UN watchers was supportive of the world organisation’s involvement. They ‘saw global governance—both in terms of the playing field and the players—as lagging behind globalization, and there was broad consensus that the United Nations should have a significant, but as yet undefined, role in “bridging the gap”’. If this is to be the case, the UN system should do better than in the past in swimming against the powerful currents of orthodoxy. As Amartya Sen, the 1998 Nobel laureate in economics who has played a major intellectual role within the outside the United Nations, prods us to recall at the dawn of the
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twenty-first century: ‘The need for critical scrutiny of standard preconceptions and political-economic attitudes has never been stronger’.75

Within this context, intergovernmental organisations, both universal and regional, should be strengthened. This is the most constant refrain throughout over half a century of the UN’s stewardship over economic and social ideas. There is of course more than a dollop of institutional self-interest behind this conviction. But more important is the dramatic reality that some countervailing power is required to offset the excesses of a decentralised system of states pursuing their national interests in combination with the private sector pursuing individual gains.

The need for a more cohesive and effective multilateral system is logical and evident. At the same time that a longing for a monolithic and top-down view of governance is comprehensible, it seems misplaced in an increasingly decentralised world. At a historical juncture when both problems and solutions transcend national borders and there is no likelihood of a central sovereign, the decibel level of calls from internationalists to strengthen intergovernmental institutions is understandably loud but ultimately wistful. We should think creatively about ways to pool the collective strengths and avoid the collective weaknesses of governments, intergovernmental organisations, NGOs and global civil society.

This irony is behind the UN’s convening of the Millennium Assembly in September 200076 and the growing emphases on the private sector and NGOs by the last two secretaries-general.77 Paradoxically, this is the conceptual and operational challenge for proponents of global governance and of the UN in the light of a changing world political economy.78

Notes
7 Since 1995 Lynne Rienner Publishers has, in cooperation with the Academic Council on the United Nations System and the UN University, published the journal Global Governance. The first issue contained contributions by then Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and his Special Representative on Internally


36 Bøts, ‘Governance as multilateral bank policy’, quotes from p 120. Morten Bøts and Desmond McNeill are directing a research project at the University of Oslo that is seeking to trace the influence of good governance and three other ideas within selected intergovernmental organisations. See their forthcoming edited volume, *The Role of Ideas in Multilateral Institutions*.


38 Boas, ‘Governance as multilateral bank policy’, p 119.


See, for example, Joseph Stiglitz, ‘Redefining the role of the state: what should it do? How should it do it? And how should these decisions be made?’, http://www.worldbank.org.


See, for example, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN document A/54/36, 23 September 1999.

Bøas, ‘Governance as multilateral bank policy’, p 129.


Finkelstein, ‘What is global governance?’, p 369.


Commission on Global Governance, Our Global Neighbourhood, p 4.

Rosenau, ‘Toward an ontology’, p 293.


